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MAKING JUDGE-SPEAK CLEAR AMIDST THE BABEL OF LAWSPEAKERS
By Michael A. Wolff 1
The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in ourselves 2

Rising above (or below) my assigned topic – how journalism
covers court decisions and the courts as an institution – I would like to
focus on how courts express themselves, because the clarity of their
expressions affects the quality of the public discussions they prompt.
I was profoundly influenced by Anthony Lewis’ great book,
Gideon’s Trumpet, which was assigned reading in a college course in
Government not long after its publication. I was editor of the daily
student newspaper, The Dartmouth, and had a faint interest in law (some
of my judicial and professorial colleagues may believe my interest
remains faint). I knew very few lawyers, however, and I had only a
vague notion of what lawyers do, other than what one gathers from
movies and television. Following college, I worked as a copy editor and
reporter for The Minneapolis Star while attending law school at the
University of Minnesota. I approach today’s topic from the lowly
vantage point of a recovering reporter.
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Gideon’s Trumpet taught us something about how to educate the
public about law, about how to communicate law in a way that the
public will understand it and respect it. 3 Cases are stories about real
people. The legal journalism spawned by Gideon’s Trumpet has
deepened public understanding and appreciation of American law and
has served as an important counterweight to the shallow criticisms of
lawyers, judges, and lawmakers that populate the ever-proliferating
media, much of which currently functions, apparently, without the need
for editors.
Early in my legal career, I was a law clerk in federal district court,
and I drafted orders and opinions that were the kind of ordinary legal
analysis that one can acquire in law school. The intended audience was
either the judge for whom I clerked, or, should he decide to put it out as
a decision or opinion, the audience might be the lawyers in the case,
their clients, and lawyers in the community or those who are interested
in the kind of case that was being decided. The judge for whom I clerked
believed, probably correctly, that few district court opinions were worth
reading and so he seldom chose opinions to publish in the Federal
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Supplement Reporter. In short, our words were intended usually for a
very small audience. As such, they were written in code or the jargon of
judicial opinion writing, part of the secret language that we, who are
members of the Amalgamated Lawyers and Judges of America, use to
keep our shop closed.
Forty years ago, the idea that a Court might have a public
information officer, for example, was unimaginable. It was even more
absurd to imagine that a reporter could call a judge and ask the judge
what he or she meant by a particular turn of phrase. Reporters, from the
mainstream media (or should I say “only-stream” media?) of
newspapers, television, and radio were left to their own wits to ascertain
what a judicial opinion might mean and to try to communicate that
interpretation to the public.
As law became more of a publicly traded commodity in the 1990s,
courts, including the Supreme Court of Missouri, began to hire public
information officers. It may strike you as odd, when you think about it,
as to why a court that communicates with words should need someone
assigned to explain to the wordsmiths of the media – and sometimes to
the public itself—what judges meant by the collections of words in their
judicial opinions. But today, we take it for granted that public
information officers are essential to the operation of a state supreme
court, and although in the abstract I find this to be curious, I was happy
to have worked with the court’s Communications Counsel, Beth Riggert,
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who is part of this symposium. Beth was very valuable in helping me
write speeches and monthly newspaper columns when I was chief
justice, and I frequently solicited editorial suggestions on draft opinions
circulating to my colleagues on the Court.
What about judicial communications? We lawyers and judges
write words. Judges, legislators, and executive branch officials use
words to express something we call “law.” Law, of course, is nothing if
it is not communicated and if it is not understood both by those writing it
and those who receive it.
Let me go back, for a moment, to the oral tradition of medieval
societies that had “lawspeakers.” In Iceland and in Scandinavian
countries, the “lawspeaker”—an official position in Iceland beginning in
the 10th century—memorized law and recited law so that people would
know what the law was. 4
Do we have “lawspeakers” today? Are they the attractive former
prosecutors who came to populate cable news when O.J. Simpson’s case
gave us occasion to obsess about law and its relation to race, sex, and
justice? But enough about Greta Van Whatever …. Do our lawspeakers
include the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who read
their opinions from the bench, but cannot get their minds around the idea
that television is outside the doors of their courtroom waiting and
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wanting to make them media stars? Are lawspeakers the members of
Congress who make impassioned speeches in the chambers of the House
and Senate where there is hardly anyone present except the one that
matters – the C-SPAN camera?
Few people actually read law in its original source works. Who
wades through excessive pages of court opinions or the Byzantine
structures of the Affordable Care Act? We the public rely on those who
read law to tell us what it is. In that sense, we may be little better
informed than those in the medieval public who were not within earshot
of the lawspeaker, but who heard about what the lawspeaker said from
someone who heard it from someone else who said he heard it firsthand.
Both the medieval information seeker and the modern citizen may suffer
from misinformation. But when law is transmitted, either orally or in
some written fashion, distortions are bound to occur.
In my early days of teaching law, I taught medical students and I
was impressed by how much “law” the medical students already knew. I
came to regard hospitals—teaching hospitals they are called—as places
where law is communicated as readily as iatrogenic infections. Let me
give you an example. Forgive me, lawyers and students, if you already
know this case from your Torts class. A generation ago the Supreme
Court of Washington held that an ophthalmologist doing an eye
examination was negligent for not doing a glaucoma test to detect
glaucoma in its early stages, regardless of the age of the patient. The
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standard of care at the time was that the glaucoma test was not done on
patients who were under the age of 40. In the case, Helling v. Carey, 5
the patient was less than 40 years old, but the Supreme Court of
Washington said that the profession’s standard of care was inadequate.
That holding of the state Supreme Court of Washington affected only the
common law of Washington as it relates to medical negligence and, as
such, was subject to revision by the legislature of that state. Within a
few years of the decision, when I was in my early 30s, I was having an
eye examination by an ophthalmologist, and he said he was going to do
a glaucoma test. When I asked him why he was doing it, he said that
“the law” required it. I was in St. Louis, Missouri, a half a continent
away from the State of Washington, and I knew that the courts of
Missouri and the legislature of Missouri had made no such law. I am
sure, however, that the report of the Washington Supreme Court
decision was carried prominently in journals and magazines that
ophthalmologists and optometrists regularly read. And those who read
the journals passed the word along to their fellow practitioners that this
is indeed what “the law” requires. We might refer to this phenomenon
as the “holy crap” effect of law, as in, “holy crap now we’ve got to do
this because the courts say have to do it.”
Sometimes judicial decisions from afar will cause firestorms
nearby. I was on the Supreme Court of Missouri when the Supreme
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Court of the United States decided the case of Kelo v. the City New
London, Connecticut, 6 the famous eminent domain case that involved
the taking by eminent domain of some beachfront property in New
London by a process that started with the declaration of blight by the
city council – a legislative body to be sure – that was carried out under
the law as it was written in the legislature of Connecticut. The United
States Supreme Court, in determining that the eminent domain was
being used for a “public purpose,” merely deferred to the determination
by the local legislative body under state law. Notwithstanding the
judicial modesty in that deference, the United States Supreme Court—
and courts generally—were vilified for the decision. The Court itself
was blamed for taking the property of the beleaguered property owners
whose valuable land was being seized so that a more economical use
could be developed. I agree with the critics that the taking of property
was an injustice, but the critics were blaming the wrong branch of
government. In the midst of the nationwide controversy, some intrepid
members of our own legislature – not wanting to be left out of a
righteous fight – introduced resolutions to change the Constitution of
Missouri to make it clear that the finding of a public purpose should not
be done by a legislature or a city council but should be determined by
the courts. 7 I thought this was a fine tribute to courts as, perhaps, the
least corruptible branch of government. But the author of the resolution
6
7

See Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
HJR 24, 93rd Gen. (Mo. 2006).

7

proclaimed that it was the court’s problem that he was trying to solve.
The resolution went nowhere, probably because someone who actually
knew the Constitution of Missouri pointed out that the Missouri
Constitution has very specific protections against the abuse of eminent
domain, including a provision that a finding of public purpose is to be
determined judicially, and not by legislative action. 8
As another example, there is a current Missouri controversy that
persists called the “Turner problem.” In Turner, the Supreme Court of
Missouri said that the law requires a school district that loses
accreditation to pay for its students who choose to attend school in an
accredited district. 9 What is impressive is the number of times I saw and
heard this referred to as a problem caused by the Supreme Court of
Missouri. Indeed, the Court has dealt with the problem on two
occasions, and on both occasions has said that the requirement of the law
is precisely as the legislature wrote it. 10 The Court was not making it up.
It was convenient for the politicians to blame the courts for the
confusion this is causing when their predecessors who passed the law
did not explain how it should be implemented – it was convenient until
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the public figured out that the problems actually could be worked out
through legislation. That may occur someday. Do not hold your breath.
Judges and courts live in a world where there are many ways that
their decisions and opinions can be interpreted and misinterpreted. Early
on in my 13 years on the Missouri Supreme Court, I came to believe that
the audience I was writing for is the nonlawyer public and the litigants,
not the lawyers. I also came to believe, under the influence of my early
days in journalism, that the legal cases can be good stories if the story of
the case is well told. Stories make legal principles understandable. The
story of Clarence Earl Gideon, in which Anthony Lewis was an early
leader in the form of journalism that has been frequently replicated,
teaches us who write legal opinions about the way to communicate.
I always have believed that judges should strive to make their
opinions clear and interesting. There are thousands of legal opinions,
and an awful lot of them are not particularly worth reading for they are
neither very clear nor interesting and frequently are redundant.
To promote clarity, we copy the best of what journalism does. In a
talk to the managing editors of Missouri’s newspapers some years ago, I
mentioned that we judges all should write – as we were told as
journalists – for the fifth grade reader. One editor interrupted me to say
it is now sixth grade, which depresses me slightly because it is a
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commentary on the state of public education. Whether fifth or sixth
grade, judges can promote clarity as follows:


Use a “lede” – a first sentence that says something about
the case and gets the reader’s attention;



Summarize upfront: Let the reader know what the issues
are and what the decision is;



Where there is more than one issue (or “point” as we say in
Missouri), use subheadings to identify each issue being
discussed and put them in the same order as the
introductory summary.



Avoid jargon, starting with the words “plaintiff,”
“appellant,” “respondent” etc. A reader is less likely to get
lost if you call parties by their names. If you must use legal
code phrases, explain briefly and immediately, so the
reader will feel just as smart as the writer. When the reader
feels stupid, he or she stops reading.



Avoid stringing together a bunch of case citations in the
text – a major case will do; the rest can go in footnotes.
Footnotes will show the reader that the judge’s law clerk
has read all the pertinent cases.



At the end, summarize succinctly what the court’s decision
is, and if the case is to be remanded to a lower court or
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administrative tribunal, tell the court and parties what they
must do.
It is a bit more difficult to say how courts can make their routine
cases more interesting, and thus, more capable of being understood. The
routine nature of many a case reminds me that a judge is sort of like
Elizabeth Taylor’s seventh husband—the judge knows what he’s
supposed to do, but he’s not sure he can make it interesting. And unlike
the advice one might give to the husband, if you cannot make it
interesting, at least make it brief (fewer trees will die).
If the case is routine, there might be something interesting about
the parties. We have to tread lightly, of course, so that we treat the
parties and the witnesses in a case with respect. When I was assigned to
write an opinion about a fellow who refused to sign his property tax
declaration because the required oath ended with “so help me God,” I
could not help but start the opinion with the following sentence:
“Robert E. Oliver, an atheist residing in Christian County, …” 11 I don’t
know if reader got the joke – but what is an atheist doing living in
Christian County? By the way, we did not strike down the statute, but
we told Mr. Oliver that he was free to cross out the words “so help me
God” and his oath would be just as good. Same goes for our own
writing: it can be just as good with fewer words. So help me God.
11

Oliver v. State Tax Com'n of Missouri, 37 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Mo. 2001).

11

I close by answering a question that may have occurred to you –
my assigned topic was about how journalism covers the courts and I
took your time to discuss how judges should do a better job of
explaining themselves. Here’s the point: Judges cannot control what
journalists say, so they should focus on what judges can control. If
judges feel journalists are not getting them right, the first thing to do is
make sure judges are speaking law as clearly as they can. “The fault,
dear Brutus, lies not in our media stars, but in ourselves…..” When I
rewrite Shakespeare, it is time to end, so help me God.
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